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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
LOUIS G. 'l'RYFONAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

112427
1

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Louis G. Tryfonas, appeals the grand
larceny conviction rendered against him.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
On February 11, 1970, appellant, Louis G. Tryfonas, was convicted and adjudged guilty of the crime of
grand larceny in the District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah, Honorable Allen B. Sorensen presiding.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
. Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for the
crime of grand larceny. Alternatively appell t
an seeks
'
to have the case remanded for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Two United States Forest Service agents confronted the appellant, Louis G. Tryfonas, on Forest Service
land in Hobble Creek Canyon. Two beef halves were in
the immediate vicinity of the appellant. The appellant
was apprehended by these agents and subsequently
charged with the crime of grand larceny. The appella~t
was never alternatively charged with the crime of petty
larceny, and during the trial no instructions regarding
the lesser offense were given.

ARGUMENT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
ON THE GROUND THAT THE STATE
FAILED TO PROVE THE CRIME CHARGED
BECAUSE NO PROOF WAS OFFERED AS TO
THE VALUE OF THE BEEF ALLEGEDLY
STOLEN, NOR 'VAS ANY PROOF OFFERED
THAT THE BEEF FIT vVITHIN THE DEFI·
NITION OF "COW" IN SECTION 76-38-4
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953).
2

Sedion 76-38-4 Utah Code Ann. ( 1953) provides:
Grand larceny is committed in either of the following cases :
(I) 'Vhen the property taken is of value exceeding $50.
( 3) \Vhen the property taken is a ... cow.

In this case the state could have attempted to prove
grand larceny in either of two ways: that the value of
the property was in excess of $50, or that the property
taken was a "cow." While the original complaint contained no reference to "cow" and charged the appellant
with taking property "of a value in excess of $50," the
state apparently abandoned this theory and attempted to
establish grand larceny because of the nature of the
property. The information had no reference to value,
charging appellant with the theft of "one cow," and the
state presented absolutely no evidence of the value of
the property allegedly taken, even though it called a witness who could have competently evaluated the worth of
the beef. ( T. 35.)
Since no evidence of value was ever presented, this
grand larceny conviction may only stand if the conduct
of the appellant, as proved by the state, fell within the
proscription of subsection ( 3) of section 76-38-4. In
other words, to properly deny the appellant's motion to
dismiss because the evidence was insufficient to establish
the elements of the offense, the state had to prove that
the appellant took a cow and not merely that he took two
pieces of a cow's carcass.
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The threshold problem here presented is: "When
does a cow
. cease being a cow t It is initially apparent
that sect10n 76-38-4 contains no reference to the theft of
beef. Therefore, it would seem that the cow must be
taken alive to fall within the statute. The Utah Supreme
Court, however, ruled in State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402
131 P.2d 805 {1942) that one means of "taking" a c011'.
is to kill it and, accordingly, grand larceny may be perpetrated by taking a dead cow if the one taking it also
/,,·illed it. In Laub the court stated:
Defendants in their brief contend that in order
to constitute the crime of grand larceny, where
the value of the meat does not exceed $50, the
calf must be shown to have been alive during the
entire course of the commission of the crime. This
contention would appear correct if the person
who took the carcass had had nothing to do with
the killing of the animal. But where the animal is
killed as a means of making the theft possible, the
crime of grand larceny is complete just as much
as if it had been loaded on a truck alive and taken
away. This was a six month old calf. It was on
the open range. If the person seeking to steal it
shot it in order to catch it, the crime of grand Jar·
ceny would be made out at the time it was shot
and taken into possession. The killing .or shoot.
ing was but the manner chosen to obtam posses·
sion. State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131P.2d805,
807 (1942).
The significance of the Laub decision is that it does
not change the obvious meaning of the statute. The ta~·
ing of a cow still is restricted to the taking of a liv~ an'.·
mal. Laub simply made it clear that a two-step takmg is
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possible within the act-killing (caption) and transporting (asportation). This decision is compatible with the
,reneral construction rule that criminal statutes must be
0
strictly construed. Laub clearly requires the one charged
with the larcenous possession to be the one who killed the
animal in order to sustain a grand larceny conviction.
Any other standard would broaden the definition of
"cow" in the act and force the court into drawing an
artificial line somewhere between the taking of a cow on
the open range which recently died a natural death and
the taking of a steak in a grocery store.
The Laub decision puts an additional burden on the
state when it attempts to prove grand larceny solely because the property allegedly taken was two pieces of
beef carcass. Assuming that the state can prove that the
defendant took the beef, it must in addition prove that
the defendant killed the cow from which the beef in his
possession came. This is an element of the offense of
grand larceny, just as proof of value in excess of $50
would be, and must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
At first blush, it would appear that the state misread the Laub case and concluded from it that proof that
the carcass was once a cow is enough to bring the conduct within the ''taking of a cow" provision. The state
made no systematic attempt to establish that the appellant killed the cow in question. At the close of the state's
case, the appellant moved for dismissal because reasonable minds could not differ with the conclusion that the
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state failed to prove the appellant killed the animal. (T
37-38.) This motion was erroneously denied.
·
Examining the state's evidence in the light most
favorable to it, only one piece of testimony had even a
remote relationship to the issue of who killed the animal.
That testimony was to the effect that the Forest Service
agents, during the course of the arrest, shined a light into
a nearby car and noticed a 45 to 50 caliber smooth bore
percussion cap rifle in the back seat. (T. 22, 27.) That,
however, is the sum total of the state's evidence on the
issue of who killed the animal. No evidence was presented as to how the cow was killed, let alone whether it had
been killed by such a distinctive weapon as a smooth bort
50 caliber rifle; no evidence was offered to prove the ob·
served weapon had been, or even could be, fired; no evi·
dence was offered that someone had head a shot; in fact,
no evidence was even offered to prove the ownership of
the car in which the rifle was spotted.
If the state is to rest on the existence of a rifle in the
back seat of somebody's car as evidence that the appel·
lant killed the cow, then surely it must make some kind
of an effort to link the rifle to both the appellant and the
means of killing the animal. In this case there is not any
evidence to support even a tenuous connection with
either. We are, therefore, presented merely with the ex·
istence of a rifle in the back of someone's car in the mid·
die of an area where many people carry firearms. With·
out so much as even testimony of a bullet hole in the car·
cass, or evidence connecting the appellant to the owner·
6

ship or possession of the weapon, no light can make this
evidence probative on the issue of who killed the cow. To
infer that since there was a rifle and a dead cow, the cow
was killed by a rifle, and then to infer that the appellant
killed the cow is at best an inference on an inference, and
more likely not even logically related.
Since no evidence of value was ever placed before
the finder of fact and since a reasonable man could not
conclude the evidence sufficient to prove the appellant
killed the cow, the crime of grand larceny was never
established as to the appellant, and his conviction must
be reversed.

ARGUMENT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD "COW" IN SECTION
76-38-4 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953).
The trial court's only instruction as to what constituted grand larceny was as follows:
'Grand Larceny' is the felonious stealing ta~ing
and carrying away of a heifer or cow, being the
personal property of another.
The appellant excepted to the instructions because
they made no effort to clarify for the jury when a cow
ceased to be a cow and when it became beef. As pointed
out in Argument I, supra, the standard in Utah is clear.
State 'V. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131P.2d805 (1942) states
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..,
that one must kill the cow in order to be liable f' or g1·and
larceny under the above definition when a live co w 1s· not
the subject of the theft.
In this instance it was crucial to any consideration
of the offense to know exactly what conduct was within
meaning of "taking a cow." Here the evidence showed
only two pieces of beef and not a live cow as the subject
matter of a possible theft. Since the instructions did not
state the Laub rule, the jury was permitted to infer that
any taking of beef could fall within the definition of
grand larceny.
The jury should have been instructed to the effect
that they could only find the appellant guilty of grand
larceny if they were convinced that he had taken part in ,
the killing of the animal. Without this instruction there
is nothing to prevent a jury from logically concluding
the theft of a side of beef from a butcher shop to be grand
larceny.
No instruction was given regarding the value of the
property taken as a means of finding grand larceny, and '
no instruction was given to the jury regarding the dif·
ferent degrees of larceny. (T. 40.) The jury was left
completely ignorant of the fact that the crime of petcy·
larceny exists and that it was entirely possible that the
appellant could .be guilty of the lesser offense an~ not
the greater. Because of the improper instructions a Juror
could have voted for a grand larceny conviction wher~he
was convinced the appellant did in fact steal somethmg,
and yet not convinced that he killed the animal. The
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state's decision to not charge the lesser offense, combined
with the improper instructions to the jury, makes it dangerously likely that a man was convicted of a crime of
greater degree than the jury really believed him guilty
of.
For the reasons stated in Argument I, supra, it is
apparent that only the crime of petty larceny is at all
supported by the evidence. If the grand larceny conviction is not reversed outright because of the insufficiency
of the evidence (see Argument I, supra), it must at least
be remanded in order that the jury may properly consider the lesser offense.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully contended that the conviction against appellant should be
reversed. Alternatively, it is contended that the case be
remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
410 Empire Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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